Incumbents, opposition and international lenders: governing Portugal in times of crisis by De Giorgi, E et al.
1Incumbents, Opposition and International
Lenders: Governing Portugal in Times of Crisis
ELISABETTA DE GIORGI*, CATHERINE MOURY
and JOA˜O PEDRO RUIVO
The Portuguese case provides a unique opportunity to study the opposition’s behaviour in
a variety of political conditions. It offers an insight into the impact of the financial crisis on
the opposition’s behaviour in both majority and minority political settings. It allows the
comparison of the opposition’s relationship with a minority government, during which
non-collaboration could have dramatic consequences, and also with a majority govern-
ment, when such a choice does not have major political or policy implications. Moreover,
it enables us to study the effect of an additional veto player (the so-called troika composed
of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary
Fund), which not only constrains both majority and opposition parties, but also gives pol-
itical entrepreneurs a unique opportunity to push ahead with liberal measures – in this
case, clearly in disagreement with the moderate and radical left programmes. Relying
on quantitative data on the legislative behaviour of the parliamentary party groups in
the period 1995–2012, and on qualitative process-tracking of the opposition’s positions
on key economic issues – such as the decision to vote against Prime Minister So´crates’
last austerity package after a series of approvals – this article aims to determine
whether, and if yes how, the financial crisis has affected the behaviour of the Portuguese
opposition parties in parliament, by examining and comparing their behaviour in hard and
in normal times.
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Introduction
Following the banking collapse in the US and shortly after the beginning of the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis in the first quarter of 2010, Portugal was pinpointed as 
a high-risk investment: demands for bonds issued by government shrank and the 
interest rate shot up. The Prime Minister (PM) Jose´ So´crates kept insisting that 
the country would not have to be bailed out on the grounds that the minority 
Socialist government was successfully approving austerity packages with the 
help of the main opposition party – the Social Democratic Party (PSD). 
However, in March 2011 the government proposed an additional fourth 
package that was rejected by all the opposition parties. This led to So´crates’ res-
ignation and, shortly after, the international lenders were called in. In the election 
of June 2011, a centre-right coalition composed of the PSD and the CDS-PP1 
obtained an absolute majority and started to implement a series of painful
2austerity measures, most of which were conditioned by the international lenders,
leading to recession and social unrest. Despite the very liberal and, for many,
unfair repercussions of these measures, the Socialist Party (PS) in opposition
voted in favour or abstained from voting on the most important packages
during the first 15 months of the current legislature, finally shifting strategy
and voting against the 2013 budget in November 2012.
This sequence of events implies several puzzles for researchers of Portuguese
politics. Why have first the PSD and then the PS supported unpopular and liberal
measures for so long? What made them shift from support to opposition? More
broadly, what impact has the crisis had on the Portuguese opposition’s behav-
iour? Is there any difference among the opposition parties? How is their behav-
iour affected by the presence of a majority or minority government?
The Portuguese case provides a unique opportunity to address these ques-
tions. It offers an insight into the impact of the financial crisis on the opposition’s
behaviour with both a minority government, during which non-collaboration
could have dramatic consequences, and a majority one, when such a choice
rarely has major political or policy implications. It also enables us to study the
effect of additional external actors – that is, the European Commission (EC)
and later the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) – on the opposition’s conduct. These actors not only constrain the
majority and opposition, but also represent a precious ally of political entrepre-
neurs who would like to push ahead with liberal measures – in this case,
clearly in disagreement with both the moderate and radical left parties’
programmes.
Our main argument is that economic crises, which jeopardise national interest
but also trigger extremely radical socio-economic measures, have an important
effect on the opposition’s behaviour. We observe that consensus in parliament
decreased with the onset of the current crisis mainly because more salient and
divisive socio-economic policies had to be approved. However, we also expect
and observe variations among parties; on the one hand the mainstream opposition
parties are more consensual than they would be if the same policies were pre-
sented in normal times (as long as they do not see a golden opportunity to get
into power themselves), and on the other hand, the radical parties are even
more adversarial than usual. In order to demonstrate these claims, we rely on
qualitative process-tracking of the Portuguese opposition’s positions on key
economic issues (including interviews with key political players) and on quanti-
tative data on the voting behaviour of the parliamentary party groups before and
after the crisis (in the period 1995–2012).
Theoretical Argument and Hypotheses
As specified in the introduction, opposition parties are always exposed to two
contrasting pressures: one towards conflict, which comes from the need to
mark their position as different from that of the government in office, and one
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and influence the policy outcome. With the financial crisis, this dilemma between
conflict and cooperation has become even more crucial. Austerity measures are
unpopular and, in bad economic times, voters are more likely to withdraw their
support for the government in office (Lewis-Beck, 1988). Thus, the opposition
parties have a choice between the need to cooperate with the majority for the
nation’s sake and the opportunity to weaken a fragile government even further
and possibly get into power at the subsequent election.
Little is said in the existing literature about the possible behaviour of the
opposition parties in such a critical situation. Previous research suggests that
the opposition’s behaviour is likely to be more adversarial on economic and
social policies (De Giorgi, 2011; Rose, 1984) and on more salient issues (Car-
ammia & De Giorgi, 2011; Mu´jica & Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2006; Stecker, 2011).
As the legislation presented by the governments to tackle the crisis is mainly
related to socio-economic issues and innately salient policies, our first hypoth-
esis is:
H1: Since the beginning of the crisis, the level of consensus between the
government and opposition parties in Portugal has decreased as the
number of socio-economic and salient policies discussed in parliament
has increased.
However, the nature of parties and the type of party competition constitute
another crucial variable affecting the behaviour of the opposition in parliament
(Duverger, 1954; Flanagan, 2001; Sartori, 1966). In particular, the mainstream
(and more moderate) parties that alternate in government are more inclined to
act responsibly than the more radical ones, which are usually permanently in
opposition (Sartori, 1966, p. 35).
This difference between permanent and alternative opposition has impli-
cations for our research question, namely the impact of the crisis on the opposi-
tion behaviour: because the legislation presented by the governments to save their
country from the economic crisis is of the highest national interest, we expect
mainstream parties to feel ‘responsible’ and cooperate with the government
even though they would have opposed these policies under normal circum-
stances. On the other hand, radical opposition parties are expected to take advan-
tage of the crisis and emphasise their dissimilarity with the government even
further. Thus, although we expect a general decrease in the level of consensus
after the onset of the crisis in Portugal (due to the rising number of salient and
socio-economic policy decisions), we expect the net impact of the crisis on the
opposition behaviour to vary from one party to another. Since the onset of the
crisis, the mainstream parties that usually alternate in government in Portugal,
namely the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP, have been expected to behave more
consensually than in normal times. We expect the contrary to be true for the
radical left parties (the PCP, PEV and BE).2 Therefore, our second hypothesis
states that:
4H2: Controlling for saliency and type of policies, since the onset of the
crisis the mainstream opposition parties have been more consensual than
the radical parties.
In this turbulent period, there is one further intervening variable that cannot be
ignored, namely the increasing influence of international actors on the economic
policy issue. Indeed, the bailout meant that the conditions set by the EC, the ECB
and the IMF forced the Portuguese government to make radical changes in their
policies. However, even before the bailout the EC had pressed for public debt and
deficit to be reduced as quickly as possible. According to previous research, Euro-
scepticism – and conversely pro-Europeanism – has a significant impact on the
government–opposition dynamics and party competition (Hooghe, Marks, &
Wilson, 2004; Sitter, 2001, 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003). We expect the
traditionally pro-European parties in opposition to be more likely to cooperate
with the government when the socio-economic measures follow the EU rec-
ommendations/orders (with or without the intervention of the IMF). Alterna-
tively, we expect the more Eurosceptic parties in opposition to have fewer
incentives to collaborate when the EU is influencing legislation.
H3: Pro-European parties in opposition are more likely to cooperate with
the government on policies recommended by the European Union than
Eurosceptic parties.
Obviously, this third hypothesis is related to the former as parties that are perma-
nently out of government tend to be more Eurosceptic (Sitter, 2001; Taggart,
1998), while Eurosceptic parties that want to become credible coalition partners fre-
quently moderate their hostility to Europe (Conti & De Giorgi, 2011; Costa Lobo &
Magalha˜es, 2011). Two different kinds of analysis – one based on interviews with
Portuguese MPs conducted at the beginning of the crisis in 2008 (Moury & De
Sousa, 2011), and the other based on the study of party manifestos in the period
from 1995 to 2005 (Costa Lobo & Magalha˜es, 2011) – indeed converge to show
that the two major parties, the PS and PSD, have a very strong pro-European atti-
tude. However, these studies also show a difference within both mainstream and
opposition parties. While the manifestos of the three radical left parties (Leftist
Bloc BE, the Communist PCP and the Greens PEV), which have never been in gov-
ernment, present strong anti-European stances, Moury and De Sousa (2011)
observed that a large majority of BE deputies believes that EU membership is a
good thing (66.7 per cent), in contrast to the small minority (29 per cent) of the
CDU (PCP-PEV) deputies who agree with this statement. Similarly, the CDS-PP
is less pro-Europe than its centre-right partner; this difference can be observed
both in the manifestos and in interviews, with a lower proportion of deputies
from CDS-PP welcoming EU membership than of PSD deputies (87 per cent
versus 97 per cent). Thus, if H3 is correct, after the crisis we should observe a vari-
ation in the voting behaviour between the CDS-PP and the two other mainstream
parties on the one hand and between the BE and the CDU on the other.
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crisis. As stated above, austerity measures are unpopular and so it is the govern-
ment that is constrained to implement them. As a consequence, the main opposi-
tion parties have a better chance during the financial crisis of replacing the
incumbents if new elections occur. So the more the government is in jeopardy
(because it is a minority government or because there is intra-coalitional dissen-
sion) and the better the prospect of the opposition parties winning office in the
case of election, the greater the opposition’s incentives to challenge – rather
than to support – the executive.3 Hence, our last research hypothesis is the
following:
H4: After the onset of the crisis, the opposition parties will be more adver-
sarial when their possibilities to replace the government in office increase.
In the next two sections, we test these four hypotheses, first in light of process-
tracking of the main events and bills approved in parliament since the start of
the crisis, and second through a quantitative data analysis of the legislation
passed before and after the crisis, in the period from 1995 to 2012.
A Political Overview of the Crisis
Opposition’s Behaviour and Narratives (2008–12)
After the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a dramatic slow-
down in the Portuguese economy. As exchange devaluation was not an option –
unlike in the previous debt crises in the 1970s and 1980s – the initial measure
taken by the first So´crates government (a single-party majority government)
was fiscal expansion. These counter-cyclical fiscal policies were taken in coordi-
nation with the EU’s initial neo-Keynesian approach to the crisis (European
Commission, 2008). These proposals received different responses in parliament,
with all opposition parties voting against the 2009 budget, but in favour of its first
amendment (with the exception of the PSD, which voted against). Nonetheless,
the reasons behind the negative votes of the various parties were very different:
while the radical left parties criticised the PS for not going far enough, the PSD
and CDS-PP considered the expansionary budget to be irresponsible.
During the second half of 2009, the Portuguese government had reported an
estimated 2.6 per cent slump in gross domestic product and a public deficit of 9.3
per cent in 2009. The European Council urged the country to engage rapidly in
policies aimed at medium-term fiscal consolidation (European Council, 2009),
thus putting an end to the short cycle of fiscal expansion. In April 2010, the
Greek government asked for financial assistance from the EU to avoid bank-
ruptcy, while the Portuguese government’s interest rates soared to their highest
level since entry into the eurozone. As the incumbent PS had lost the absolute
majority in parliament when a general election was called in September 2009,
the new Socialist minority government urged the parliamentary opposition to
help approve the budget for 2010. According to Portuguese economists, this
6budget was not a real austerity plan. Nevertheless, the freezing of public sector
salaries and the plan to reduce state personnel carried the message that needed
to be heard by the markets and the EU leaders. The left-wing parties accused
international financial speculators of robbing the country with the acquiescence
of the government and rejected the bill. While blaming the previous Socialist
governments (of both Guterres and So´crates) for getting the country into
trouble, the PSD and the CDS abstained from voting and let the budget pass.
Just three days after the budget’s approval, on 12 March, the government
went back to parliament to ask for support for the Stability and Growth Pro-
gramme (SGP) 2010–13, before delivering it to the EU. Unlike the budget, the
SGP was undoubtedly an austerity package composed of a wide set of hard
fiscal measures. Both the CDS and the radical left parties soon announced they
would vote against it. For the parliamentary left, the Portuguese governments
had mistakenly followed the path of recessionary budget policies that would
not only fail to solve the debt crisis but also destroy the national economy, dis-
mantle the welfare state and increase social inequalities. The CDS, for its part,
blamed the Socialist government for targeting the poor and most vulnerable
and lacking a strategy to lead the country back to growth. Despite sharing a
similar discourse, the PSD (just before the election of its new leader Pedro
Passos Coelho) decided to negotiate the first austerity package and abstained
from voting: political stability was of greater national interest, especially after
Fitch’s downgrading of the Portuguese credit rating.
By the end of the first quarter of 2010, Portugal was boarding the Greek ship
and starting to muddle through the storm of recessionary austerity packages,
reports of negative growth, rising unemployment and poor fiscal behaviour,
downgrading credit rates, and spiking yields. Despite an ever critical stance
towards the government, the PSD negotiated two additional austerity packages
with the PS and abstained from voting on them once in parliament. Whenever
talks with the government broke down, the president of the Republic (PR),
Anı´bal Cavaco Silva, pushed the PSD – the party he had led in the 1980s and
1990s – back to the negotiating table.
Such a cycle would eventually come to an end in early 2011, when the gov-
ernment lost support from all sides of the political spectrum, in particular from
the PR. While the three initial packages of the So´crates government had been sus-
tained by the president, Cavaco Silva’s re-election in January 2011 marked a
turning point. In February, the president vetoed a decree law for the first time
in five years of cohabitation with the PS in government. His inauguration
speech soon afterwards, on 9 March 2011, was regarded by many politicians
and observers as a ‘declaration of war’ to the government. The scene was set
for an institutional conflict between the PR and the government.
In the meantime, the government was forced to negotiate a fourth austerity
package with the EU, which basically consisted of an amended version of the
SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) 2011–14. According to the PSD, the nego-
tiations were conducted behind the backs of the parliamentary opposition and
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SGP in parliament, the PM declared he would resign if the opposition proposed
a resolution against the programme which received a majority vote in parliament.
Rejecting the government package would therefore trigger a political crisis in the
middle of a financial storm, and the opposition should be blamed accordingly.
This behaviour made many observers conclude that the PM was keen to make
the government fail before the bailout by also blaming the opposition parties
for their lack of responsibility.
Despite the pressure of new rating downgrades, the PR did not take action to
rescue the plan from rejection on the grounds that the presidency had been pre-
vented from using its influence owing to the lack of information given by the gov-
ernment on the new austerity package. The PSD voted against it and the PM
immediately resigned. The main arguments used by the PSD to explain its
shift in voting behaviour and the rejection of the fourth and last austerity
package of the PS executive were the eroded authority and credibility of the
socialists in managing the crisis, as well as the alleged negotiations of the
fourth austerity package with the European authorities behind the backs of parlia-
ment, the president and the social partners. In the aftermath of these events, the
caretaker government had no choice but to ask for the bailout on 6 April, at the
beginning of the electoral campaign.
The negotiating process was conducted by the government on behalf of the
Portuguese Republic and a memorandum of understanding was signed in May
by the lenders – the so-called troika, composed of the EC, the ECB and the
IMF – and the three mainstream parties: the PS, PSD and CDS. This was a
signal that, no matter which party was going to win the election, the new govern-
ment would inevitably be constrained by the commitments to its international
lenders. By contrast, the radical parties (PCP, PEV and BE) claimed that the
bailout was undemocratic and unnecessary and refused to participate in discus-
sions with the troika.
At the general election held in June 2011, the centre-right coalition (PSD and
CDS-PP) obtained an absolute majority and the head of the PSD, Pedro Passos
Coelho, became the new PM. As the agent of the troika, Coelho’s government
had to implement a series of painful austerity measures, triggering recession
and social unrest. Once in opposition, the PS started to blame the government
for the ever worsening crisis, thus aligning its discourse with the more radical
parties on the left. Despite this common discourse and the actual ‘irrelevance’
of its voting choice in the current majority setting, the PS had been quite coop-
erative on the major policy packages proposed by the government until Novem-
ber 2012 (and arguably more painful and inconsistent with its ideological
background). While the three radical left parties constantly voted against the gov-
ernment packages, the PS abstained from voting on both the 2012 budget, which
included tax increases and public sector wage cuts, and the new labour legis-
lation, which introduced cuts in pay and holidays and the easing of restrictions
on lay-offs and workers’ dismissals. In addition, the socialists voted in favour
8of amending the legal regimes on the recapitalisation and consolidation of the
banking sector with the help of the state and the privatisations of state-owned
enterprises. Finally, the PS also approved the ratification of the EU Fiscal
Compact in April 2012 (with Portugal being the first member state to ratify the
treaty). The need to act responsibly vis-a`-vis the 2011 bailout agreement that
all were prepared to sign was again the main reason behind their choices (accord-
ing to the socialist deputies interviewed).4 However, a shift was observed in
November 2012 when the PS voted against both a second amendment to the
2012 budget and the 2013 budget – blaming the government for its incompetence
and stubborn insistence on austerity, and failure to take action to foster economic
growth. From then on, the socialists tended to align their legislative behaviour
with the parties on the left, voting against some critical and highly politicised
bills, all framed by the crisis: the merging of local government constituencies,
the regulation of labour relations in the private sector (cuts in compensations
for dismissals) and in the public sector (reducing the security of the work con-
tract, and increasing the weekly working hours), and a new austerity budget
for 2014. In addition, the PS also started to request a review of the constitution-
ality of austerity laws approved by the centre-right majority. In key issues the
Court has ruled in favour of the socialists, thus pushing the government to find
alternative measures under the oversight and pressure of the troika. On some
occasions, though, the PS kept a distance from the leftist opposition parties,
especially when the recapitalisation of the banking sector or fostering private
investments (through tax credits) was at stake.
Understanding the Opposition’s Choices
As stated already, the above narratives offer several puzzles. What can explain
first the PSD and then the PS support of unpopular government measures?
What can justify a shift in the conduct of those parties at one given moment in
time? And what reasons can be found for the variation among parties?
The answer to the first question lies in the risk involved in the crisis, namely
default and bankruptcy – a matter of great national interest – for which the two
major parties, the PS and the PSD, felt responsible even from the opposition
benches (H2). Although it is true that the socialists and the centre-right parties
had been ideologically close for decades,5 few of the bills just mentioned
would have got the support of the major opposition parties in normal times. It
seems that the PSD and PS had felt constrained by a sense of responsibility
and, for the latter, by the commitment to fulfil the agreement signed with the
international lenders.
This sense of obligation was not shared by the radical left parties or the CDS-
PP. As has been said, the permanent exclusion of the former from government
might help to explain their adversarial conduct even in hard times (H2), but
this does not help us to understand the CDS-PP’s controversial behaviour.
Here the pro- or anti-European attitudes could contribute to our investigation
(H3). As noted above, the PS and PSD are as unequivocally pro-European as
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about Europe. This ambiguity might help explain why the CDS-PP was less
inclined to consensus than its social democratic ally, despite its ambition to
govern. Similarly, the pro-European stance of the PS and PSD (together with
their centrality in the political spectrum) might contribute to explaining their col-
laboration with the government on relevant socio-economic legislation. On the
other hand, the Euroscepticism of the radical left parties sheds additional light
on why they have systematically opposed the government’s measures in times
of crisis.
One last puzzle tabled by the Portuguese story has to do with the reason why,
after three crucial abstentions, the PSD finally decided to vote for a resolution
against the fourth austerity package proposed by the Socialist government and
why a similar shift was observed in the PS behaviour from November 2012.
We hypothesise that these decisions were taken because the main opposition
parties’ possibilities to gain office in the case of an election had increased signifi-
cantly immediately prior to these specific moments. The intentions of vote in the
2010–12 period (Figure 1) in fact show that both the PSD and the PS changed
their voting behaviour from cooperative to conflictual when the electorate’s
Figure 1: Evolution of Vote Intention for the PS and PSD (March 2010–January 2013)
Source: http://margensdeerro.blogspot.pt by Pedro Magalha˜es.
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voting intentions moved in their favour. As shown in Figure 1, the voting inten-
tions were in favour of the PS when the first two packages were voted upon and
were almost even between the PS and PSD when the third one was approved; but
the PSD had a clear edge when the fourth package was presented to parliament.
Supported by voting intention polls and probably under significant internal
pressure from its party and the PR himself (Magalha˜es, 2012), Passos Coelho
chose to join the rest of the opposition parties in rejecting the additional
package proposed by the PS. This move led to a significant decrease in its
support so that the election results were actually quite vague.
A similar dynamic could be observed for the PS in opposition. After abstain-
ing from voting for the major socio-economic measures proposed by the centre-
right government during the first 15 months of the current legislature, the PS
decided to vote against the government’s proposal in November 2012 – a time
when polls on voting intentions gave it an edge over the PSD (and the governing
coalition was showing clear signs of internal conflict).
Therefore, while a sense of responsibility and pro-European attitudes pushed
the two larger parties to cooperate with the government even from the opposition
benches, this support had a limit: when a party could make the government fall
and/or had a good chance of winning if there were an election, self-interest
prevailed.
Interviews with key players at the time of the crisis support this explanation.
As a former PSD minister said when asked about what explained the decision to
vote against the fourth austerity package in March 2011: ‘If the opposition sees
that the life expectancy of the government is long, then it will let the measures
pass; if, on the contrary . . . the opposition party sees an opportunity to get in
power itself, obviously it will start to oppose the government measures’. A
similar reasoning was made by a former junior minister from the PS: ‘In Portugal,
no one accepts that the opposition is against everything at the beginning of its
mandate. There is the feeling that a party that aspires to govern should adopt a
responsible behaviour. But there are also some political strategies at stake:
now [January 2013] the opinion polls give the edge to the PS. As the crisis
always brings governmental instability, the PS knows that it is just a matter of
time before it will be back in government’.
Comparing Opposition in Normal and Hard Times: Quantitative Data
Analysis
Although the qualitative data analysed so far tell an interesting story, the focus on
the most important socio-economic measures might create a distorted view of the
overall reality. We therefore decided to rely also on more quantitative data and
analyse the opposition’s voting behaviour on the final approval of the laws in par-
liament from 1995 onwards. We focused on: two Socialist minority governments,
one during Portugal’s ‘golden years’ of economic growth (Guterres I, 1995–99)
and the other in the period just after the onset of the financial crisis (So´crates II,
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2009–11); two majority coalition governments (PSD and CDS-PP), the first in
relatively good economic times (Barroso II, 2002–4) and the second just after
the bailout (the current Passos Coelho, 2011–); and one single-party majority
government, which was in charge before and after the beginning of the crisis
(So´crates I, 2005–9). This broad scope allows us to compare the opposition’s
voting behaviour in normal and hard times and test the influence of further vari-
ables mentioned in our hypotheses.6
The Dependent Variable
As we have said, we investigated the voting behaviour of the Portuguese parlia-
mentary parties and chose the consensual voting of the opposition party groups in
parliament as our dependent variable. In order to measure the level of consensus
shown by the Portuguese opposition during the five selected governments, we
shall refer to the favourable voting behaviour during the final stage of the law-
making process. The information refers to the parliamentary party groups’
voting choice on all the approved laws other than those dealing with administra-
tive reorganisation. As the online archive also enables us to identify how many
MPs voted against their own group, we were able to employ Capo’s index of con-
sensus in parliament, used by Mu´jica and Sa´nchez-Cuenca (2006):
Consensus in parliament = vf
n∗v( )/N
where vf stands for the number of votes for the law, n for the number of MPs
belonging to the main party, v for the total number of cast votes, and N for the
size of the Assembly. If the index has value ‘1’, the incumbent party does not
obtain support from any other parliamentary group. If the index has a value
over ‘1’, the incumbent gets support from other groups: the more the support,
the higher the number.
The Operationalisation of the Independent and Controlling Variables
As noted above, our main assumption is that the crisis has had an impact on the
level of consensus in parliament. So a dummy variable has been created to ident-
ify the beginning of the crisis, even though there is no straightforward definition
of when the crisis really started. The fall of Lehman Brothers on 15 September
2008 is considered by many observers as the official ‘beginning’ of the world
crisis. Hence, we built one dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ after 15 Septem-
ber and ‘0’ before. But in order to capture the effect of the Portuguese bailout on
the opposition’s behaviour, we created another dummy taking value ‘1’ after 6
April 2011 and ‘0’ before. We expect both these variables to be negatively
related to the level of consensus in parliament.
In order to test the net effect of the crisis, we decided to control for four vari-
ables that are likely to influence opposition voting behaviour. First, the policy
area: socio-economic policies are expected to be more conflictual because
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parties are expected to represent different socio-economic interests. Thus, we
classified each law following the 21 categories of the Comparative Agendas
Policy Project7 and then created a dummy variable to distinguish the laws
dealing with the socio-economic policy sector – which is the sum of four differ-
ent policy areas, respectively called macroeconomic issues, general labour and
employment, general social welfare, general banking and finance – from all
the others. We called this variable Socio-economic sector and we expect it to
be negatively associated with the opposition’s propensity to vote yes or to
abstain rather than to vote no.
Second, the type of government: Portugal has experienced alternating types
of government – coalition and single-party, majority and minority. The concen-
tration of the executive power in a strong single-party majority cabinet gives the
opposition very different political opportunities in parliament, compared with
those given by the concentration of the executive in either a minority government
or a coalition government. In the first case, the parliamentary opposition has
neither space for nor interest in intervening or negotiating with the government
in office, which is already supported by a strong and usually disciplined single-
party majority. At the same time, this situation obliges the official parliamentary
opposition to propose itself as constructive and alternative, in order to compete
for power at the following election. In the second case, the life of parliamentary
opposition seems to be more advantageous, particularly for smaller parties, which
are the government’s crucial allies so as to obtain the majority in parliament
(essential in the case of minority government, and sometimes necessary when
intra-coalition divergence occurs). As the opposition parties might behave differ-
ently depending on the type of government in office, we decide to control this
variable (Majority government).
It is also believed that the author of the bill affects the level of cooperation
between majority and opposition (De Giorgi & Marangoni, 2009; Mu´jica &
Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2006). This is so because by definition the parliamentary oppo-
sition opposes the government (Dahl, 1966). We therefore assume that the oppo-
sition will be more adversarial when a government bill is at stake. As a control
variable, we thus created a dichotomous variable (Initiative), which assumes
value ‘1’ when the law in question is proposed by the government or any majority
party member and value ‘0’ otherwise.
Finally, some scholars emphasise that the characteristics of the legislative
acts are likely to have a substantive effect on the patterns of voting behaviour.
Giuseppe Di Palma (1977) showed how the high degree of consensualism
found in the lawmaking process in the first four legislatures of the Italian
Republic was largely due to the poor quality of the laws enacted. In a
widely polarised and fragmented party system, an impressive number of
leggine (small laws) limited in both scope and policy comprehensiveness
helped parliamentary actors to find the necessary compromise and agreement.
Speculating a little on these acknowledgements, we expect the opposition to be
more consensual on legislation that is limited in policy comprehensiveness
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(and hence, less relevant). As a result, we use the number of committees
involved in the lawmaking process as a proxy for the political relevance of
each bill and it is also controlled.
Opposition in Normal and Hard Times: A Description
Do we observe any difference after the crisis in terms of types of law approved
and the consequent level of conflict created in parliament? Our first hypothesis is
based on the assumption that a larger number of relevant bills dealing with socio-
economic issues has been approved since the start of the crisis in Portugal and
that both the relevance and the issue area of a given bill have an impact on the
opposition’s voting behaviour. By examining the content of the laws approved
during the five governments under analysis, we can actually observe a clear
increase in the amount of legislation dealing with relevant and socio-economic
policies in the years of the financial crisis (Table 1).
Whereas socio-economic laws are never more than 24 per cent of the total in
the first three governments under analysis, they reach 34.5 per cent of the total
legislation during both the second So´crates government and the current Passos
Coelho government. Furthermore, in Table 1 we can see a clear increase in the
average number of committees involved in the approval process of these bills.
Thus, owing to the rise of both the number of socio-economic bills and their
level of comprehensiveness (given by the increasing number of committees
involved in their approval), we would expect the level of conflict in parliament
to increase as well.
Table 2 presents the average index of consensus per legislature. In the last
row we can see that, on average, the Portuguese parliament is quite consensual:
the index is well above unity for each legislature and on average more than one-
third of the bills are passed with a positive vote from every parliamentary group
Table 1: Average Percentage of Socio-economic Laws, Number of Words and Committees per
Legislature
Percentage of Laws Approved Dealing with
Socio-economic Issues
Average Number of Committees
Involved
Guterres I 23.7 1.3
(1995–99)
Barroso 17.7 1.2
(2002–4)
So´crates I 22.2 1.4
(2005–9)
So´crates II 34.5 2.5
(2009–11)
Passos Coelho 34.5 2.9
(2011–)
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in parliament. But a look at Table 3 also grants some support to our hypothesis
concerning the negative impact of the crisis on the voting behaviour of the
opposition in parliament: if we compare the two Socialist minority governments
led by Guterres and So´crates or the two PSD/CDS coalition governments led by
Barroso and Passos Coelho – thus keeping both the variable type of govern-
ment and party in office constant – we observe a decrease in the level of con-
sensus after the crisis in both cases (especially if we compare the two centre-
right governments). Our first hypothesis seems to be confirmed. As it might
be argued that the above numbers mix very important and more trivial legis-
lation, Table 2 also presents the main index of consensus for pieces of legis-
lation that went through at least two committees (one-fifth of the total of all
bills) – thus more inclusive and probably more relevant in terms of policy com-
prehensiveness. If we look at the percentage of laws that are passed unani-
mously, we observe the same downward trends – which are particularly clear
for the centre-right governments.
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics about the voting behaviour of
each opposition party during the five governments under analysis. As we can
see, the opposition parties vote together with the government much more often
than they abstain or vote against. Crossing the average per party with the
average per legislature, we can see that the Portuguese opposition parties voted
in favour of legislation almost half of the time, while they abstained 20 per
cent and voted against only 30 per cent of the time. The figures are broadly the
same when we look at important legislation only (with a slightly higher percen-
tage of positive votes). However, we do observe variation across time and parties.
Most importantly, Table 3 shows how the proportion of negative votes is lower
during minority governments (Guterres I and So´crates II) and how radical left
parties are significantly less inclined to consensus than mainstream parties (see
the last column on the right). These findings hold for both the entire legislation
and the subset of relevant legislation only.
Table 2: Index of Consensus per Legislature and Percentage of Votes for which every
Parliamentary Group Votes in Favour, All Legislation (and Important Legislation Only)
Legislature Capo’s Index Number of Unanimous Laws (%) N
Guterres I 1.66 (1.69) 42.6 (44.2) 357 (95)
(PS, minority)
Barroso 1.55 (1.38) 34.1 (25.8) 167 (31)
(PSD/CDS-PP, majority)
So´crates I 1.52 (1.54) 30.5 (35.0) 344 (40)
(PS, majority)
So´crates II 1.62 (1.67) 27.3 (42.9) 88 (7)
(PS, minority)
Passos Coelho 1.31 (1.23) 11.1 (10.5) 54 (19)
(PSD/CDS-PP, majority)
Average: 1.61 (1.58) 34.1 (35.9) 1010 (192)
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Comparing minority and coalition governments before and after the crisis,
Table 3 also indicates that the impact of the crisis on the PS and PSD, which
vote less frequently against the government after the crisis (and abstain more
often), is very different from the impact on the CDS-PP and on the PCP and
PEV, for which the opposite is true. As for the BE, no significant difference is
observable across time during the two governments. If we look at the most impor-
tant legislation only, the difference in time is even more marked for the PS
and PSD (in the decrease in ‘nays’ and the increase in ‘abstentions’) and for
Table 3: Percentage of No, Yes and Abstention Votes per Opposition Party and per Government
Guterres I Barroso So´crates I So´crates II Passos Coelho Average
PS No 24 (36) 20 23
(16) (28)
Yes 62 51 59
(46) (47) (46)
Abst. 14 29 18
(18) (37) (26)
PSD No 12 22 9.0 17
(10) (24) (0.0) (15)
Yes 61 60 64 61
(64) (60) (40) (61)
Abst. 27 19 27 23
(26) (17) (60) (24)
CDS-PP No 12 25 17 19
(15) (26) (20) (15)
Yes 64 49 60 56
(68) (50) (40) (61)
Abst. 24 26 27 25
(17) (23) (40) (24)
CDU∗ No 16 39 45 34 59 35
(16) (50) (34) (60) (42) (31)
Yes 64 47 37 48 14 47
(60) (39) (49) (40) (26) (48)
Abst. 21 14 18 19 28 19
(25) (11) (17) (0.0) (32) (21)
BE No 43 32 55 44 44
(61) (32) (60) (42) (31)
Yes 43 53 24 40 40
(29) (54) (40) (26) (48)
Abst. 14 15 22 16 17
(11) (15) (0.0) (32) (21)
Total: No 14 37 34 29 45 31
(14) (49) (29) (35) (33) (24)
Yes 63 50 47 48 31 48
(64) (38) (53) (45) (33) (53)
Abst. 23 14 19 22 25 21
(24) (13) (18) (25) (33) (23)
Note: We excluded the bills presented exclusively by the opposition party groups from the analysis.
In parentheses important bills only (N ¼ 1009 and 116).
∗We initially codified the two groups PCP and PEV separately, but we present them together for the
sake of clarity, as their voting behaviour is almost identical.
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the CDS-PP (in the decrease in ‘ayes’). As far as the PCP and PEV are concerned,
we see a huge increase in ‘nays’ from Guterres to So´crates II, but a decrease from
Barroso to Passos Coelho. Finally, the BE clearly voted ‘no’ on the most impor-
tant legislation more often before the crisis than after.
The Analysis
In order to isolate the effect of the crisis on opposition voting behaviour from
other possible intervening variables, we computed a multinomial logistic
regression. In Table 4, we evaluate the impact of a series of variables on each
party’s propensity to vote yes or abstain rather than to vote no. Together with
the controlling variables specified above, we insert – as our main independent
variable – a dummy for the start of the crisis (the fall of Lehman Brothers on
15 September 2008) and for the date of the Portuguese bailout (7 April 2011).8
We observe a significant independent effect of the crisis on the opposition
parties’ behaviour but, as expected, the direction of the change varies from one
party to another according to its governing aspirations and European attitudes.
Table 4 shows that the two most pro-European parties, the PS and the PSD,
which have always alternated in government, tend to act more consensually after
the beginning of the crisis than they did before, ceteris paribus. The PS, for
example, is almost twice as likely to abstain – rather than to vote no – since
the bailout and international intervention. Similarly, the PSD, which came into
power just after the bailout, was actually 50 per cent more likely to abstain
rather than to vote no after the fall of Lehman Brothers. By contrast, everything
being constant, remarkably the PCP and PEV appear to be less likely to vote yes
rather than no after the start of the crisis and the bailout.9 No independent effect
of the crisis could be found for the CDS-PP, whereas for the BE the start of the
crisis increased (rather than decreased, as we would expect) the odds of abstain-
ing rather than voting no by 66 per cent.
Three groups of parties can thus be distinguished according to the impact the
crisis has had so far on their behaviour: the PS and PSD, which appear to have
been, ceteris paribus, less adversarial since the crisis began; the PCP and PEV,
for which the contrary is true; and the CDS-PP and BE, for which no significant
influence could be identified. This corresponds with our expectations in H2 and
H3: from the mainstream and very pro-EU PS and PSD, to the radical and Euro-
sceptic PCP and PEV, the CDS-PP and the BE being subject to contradictory
forces (governmental ambition but ambiguity on the EU for the CDS-PP, and per-
manency of opposition but moderate Euroscepticism for the BE). These findings
thus support H2 andH3 that the crisis would have contradictory effects according
to whether the parties are permanently in opposition (or not) on the one hand and
their pro- or anti-European stances on the other.
Also in line with our expectations, most of the controlling variables proved to
have a significant impact on the opposition’s voting behaviour in parliament.
First, we see that when we have a minority government, all opposition parties
GOVERNING PORTUGAL IN TIMES OF CRISIS
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Table 4: Factors Affecting the Decision of Opposition Parties to Vote Yes or to Abstain rather than Vote No (Excluding Votes on Initiatives from the
Opposition)
PS PSD CDS-PP PCP PEV BE
Yes Abst. Yes Abst. Yes Abst. Yes Abst. Yes Abst. Yes Abst.
B (B) B (B) B (B) B (B) B (B) B (B)
(Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.)
Intercept 0.42 20.40 0.93∗∗ 20.20 0.79∗∗ 0.01 20.11 20.73∗ 20.13 20.76∗∗ 20.19 21.26∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.437) (0.003) (0.586) (0.008) (0.974) (0.622) (0.006) (0.556) (0.04) (0.473) (0.001)
Majority government – – 0.71∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.38 0.29
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.27) (0.503)
Simple bills (less than
one committee)
0.60 0.00 20.03 20.15 20.00 0.05 20.09 20.17 20.07 20.20 0.16 0.20
(0.173) (1.000) (0.907) (0.655) (0.993) (0.881) (0.682) (0.504) (0.759) (0.434) (0.526) (0.58)
Socio-economic bill 22.03∗∗∗ 20.65 20.91 0.03 20.89∗∗∗ 20.13 21.00∗∗∗ 20.96∗∗∗ 20.91∗∗∗ 20.89∗∗∗ 20.93∗∗∗ 21.52∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.199) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.901) (0.000) (0.625) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Multiparty bills 1.16∗ 0.18 0.90∗∗∗ 20.40 0.58∗∗ 20.69∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 0.30 1.39∗∗∗ 0.39 1.52∗∗∗ 0.31
(0.016) (0.774) (0.000) (0.198) (0.010) (0.016) (0.000) (0.208) (0.000) (0.107) (0.000) (0.331)
Crisis – – 0.31 0.54∗ 20.49 0.31 20.23 0.24 20.38∗ 0.10 0.15 0.66∗
(0.218) (0.06) (0.831) (0.23) (0.266) (0.325) (0.057) (0.659) (0.515) (0.021)
IMF 0.72 1.04∗ – – – – 20.85∗ 20.09 20.54 0.02 20.41 20.21
(0.130) (0.046) (0.032) (0.82) (0.15) (0.953) (0.24) (0.609)
N 214 799 799 994 1009 653
Nagelkerke R 0.21 0.138 0.127 0.227 0.227 182
Note: Reference category: ∗p , 0.1; ∗∗p , 0.01; ∗∗∗p , 0.001. B ¼ Unstandardised regression coefficients.
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are significantly more likely to vote yes or abstain than to vote no. These govern-
ments had probably involved the opposition much more in the lawmaking process
than they would have done if supported by a parliamentary majority, thus leading
to a more consensual decision-making process. Socio-economic policies, for their
part, are significantly less likely to trigger a yes than a no (and often an abstention
than a no) from the opposition parties – thus supporting the claim that these types
of law are more divisive than the others. Finally, we observe that bipartisan or
multiparty bills are far more likely to trigger a yes than a no (for almost all
parties), but their effect on abstention is not conclusive. On the other hand, we
find no support for the effect of the number of committees on voting behaviour,
suggesting that more complex laws (at least according to our measure of com-
plexity) do not trigger different votes from simple laws.
Conclusions
The opposition’s voting behaviour is always pulled between a tendency towards
conflict and one towards cooperation. Since the beginning of the crisis, making a
choice between these two options has become even more difficult for the opposi-
tion because it implies choosing between the need to cooperate with the majority
for the nation’s sake and the opportunity to weaken an already fragile govern-
ment. This contribution has explored how Portuguese opposition parties
responded to this dilemma.
Our first conclusion is that, due to the financial crisis, the level of consensus
between the government and opposition parties has decreased. The main reason
for this decline is the rising number of socio-economic and salient policies –
usually more controversial – discussed in parliament. However, both qualitative
and quantitative analyses demonstrate a strong variation in the effect of the crisis
on the opposition’s behaviour across parties. Whereas mainstream and tradition-
ally pro-European parties (first the PSD and then the PS) are less adversarial than
they would be in normal times, the exact opposite is true for the PCP and PEV,
two more radical and Eurosceptic parties. Results are more mixed for the CDS-PP
and the BE, which are less extreme in their positive and negative European
stances (respectively). These findings thus illustrate the importance of both the
exclusion from power and the role external actors play in conditioning the oppo-
sition’s behaviour in parliament: the European Commission, the European
Council, and, since the bailout, the so-called troika (EC, ECB and IMF) have
played a large role – both positively and negatively – in the current govern-
ment–opposition relationship. Finally, we observe a variation across time in
the sense that, after the onset, the mainstream opposition parties are more adver-
sarial when the possibility of their replacing the government in office increases.
Commitment and cooperation do not always prevail over an opposition party’s
ambition to rule.
The drift towards conflict, however, is not just a prerogative of the opposition.
Self-calculation might have been crucial to So´crates’ decision to present a fourth
GOVERNING PORTUGAL IN TIMES OF CRISIS
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austerity package to parliament without involving opposition parties in the draft-
ing. A similar dynamic seems to have happened with the new PSD/CDS majority
government, when a package of austerity measures to be implemented from 2013
onwards was negotiated with the troika without consulting the PS (which, in
response, felt free to vote against the budget for 2013). Again, by the end of
the bailout in 2014, the same government was accused of negotiating fiscal pol-
icies with the EU and the IMF behind the scenes. The alleged lack of dialogue
with the opposition by both Portuguese prime ministers illustrates that the
decision of the opposition parties to vote against or in favour of governmental
initiatives may not depend exclusively on their own preferences. It is also contin-
gent on the governing parties’ willingness to collaborate.
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Notes
1. The PSD (Social Democratic Party) and the CDS-PP (Democratic and Social Centre – People’s
Party) are centre-right parties belonging to the European Popular Party. Despite its brief drift to
a populist Eurosceptic stance in the 1990s, the CDS has been ideologically closer to European
Christian democracy.
2. The parliamentary left in Portugal is composed of three parties: the PCP (the Portuguese Commu-
nist Party), the PEV (the left Ecologist Party), and the BE (the Left Bloc, a libertarian left party).
The PCP and the PEV usually join together in a pre-electoral coalition (CDU), but split up again in
parliament.
3. This argument is clearly supported in Portugal, which had already experienced two financial crises
that pushed the country into asking for international financial assistance from the IMF in 1978–79
and in 1983–85. Those interventions, like the current one, triggered political instability and early
elections. In two of the three cases, the parliamentary opposition played a crucial role in the gov-
ernment’s fall, while in 1983 the government resigned after controversies both within the PSD and
with its coalition partner, the CDS. Interestingly, majority coalition governments represented the
solution after each fall in order to ensure the legitimacy of the hard policy packages to be
implemented under the IMF terms.
4. Face-to-face interviews with 25 former ministers and deputies, January 2013.
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5. The Socialists’ policy positions, as measured by the policy proposals contained in party manifestos
(Volkens et al., 2011), have become closer to those of the parties on their right than on their left.
6. Here we are following Leston-Bandeira (2004).
7. For further details, see the category list of the Comparative Policy Agendas Project at http://www.
comparativeagendas.org
8. The analysis was also run with a dummy measuring the effect of the dramatic increase in interest
rates (January 2010), which did not have any additional impact on opposition behaviour.
9. For the PCP: after the crisis, the odds of voting yes rather than no decreased by 15 per cent (1–
0.85). For the PEV, these odds decreased by 62 per cent (1–0.38).
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